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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HARRY L. YOUNG & SONS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
- vs-

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, and
DENNIS A. ASHTON,
Defendants.

Case No.
13866

PLAINTIFFS BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This action is a petition for review of a workmen's
compensation award made by the defendant Industrial
Commission to the defendant Ashton as a result of injuries
allegedly sustained as a result of an industrial accident on
August 26, 1973, at Tempe, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The defendant Industrial Commission ruled that the
defendant Ashton was an employee of Harry L. Young
& Sons, Inc. for workmen's compensation purposes and
entitled to benefits as provided by law.
1
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW
The plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Industrial Commission's Finding and Order entered in the above-entitled
case, and for a determination that the defendant Ashton
was not an employee of Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc., but
that he was an independent contractor.
:i-

STATEMENT OF FACTS

*.

In March, 1973, Ashton was contacted by Charles
Dinneen who had a truck leased to Harry L. Young &
Sons, Inc., who asked him to act as one of the drivers
on his truck. (R 18-19)
Inasmuch as Dinneen was operating as a lease operator for Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc., which is a regulated
interstate motor carrier subject to the Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations, it was necessary for the safety director of
Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. to verify Ashton's qualifications to operate a leased vehicle under the Motor Carrier
authority of Young.
At the time Ashton filled out his application so that
Young could make a determination as to whether he met
the Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, it was explained to
him that the purpose of the processing of the papers was
to determine whether he was qualified for driving under
Department of Transportation and Company Safety Regulations, and he signed a form acknowledging that, which
was a part of the paper work involved with Young's
compliance with the Motor Carrier Safety Regulations and
which set out the fact that he was not a Young employee.
(R 185, Exhibit # 3 ; and, R 208, Exhibit # 2 3 4
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From March of 1973, to July of 1973, Ashton drove
the truck owned by Dinneen and being leased for freight
hauling purposes to Young, and also drove for another
lease operator, Guy Sainsbury, after Dinneen's truck was
wrecked. (R 41). While driving for both Dinneen and
Sainsbury, he received his pay for services to them from
the Intermountain Accounting Corporation which handled
their accounting and disbursing for them. (R 186-188,
Exhibits 4, 5 and 6)
In July, 1973, Ashton ceased driving for either
Dinneen or Sainsbury, and entered into a lease purchase
agreement with a corporation known as Inland Transport, Inc., a Utah corporation, for the lease with an option
to purchase of a Kenworth Tractor. (R 189, Exhibit 7)
Under that Lease-Purchase Agreement, Ashton was obligated to pay $585.28 per month for 34 months, plus
$26.34 use tax, and to maintain insurance on the vehicle,
and keep the vehicle in appropriate repair. At the time
Ashton entered into the Lease-Purchase Agreement with
Inland Transport, Inc., and for the purpose of using said
vehicle for his gain, he entered into a Lease Agreement
with Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc., referred to in the
Agreement to maintain reserve account, (R 190, Exhibit
8), and in order to guarantee the Lease-Purchase payments
to Inland Transport, Inc., as required under the LeasePurchase Agreement, he entered into an additional agreement with Inland Transport, Inc. to maintain a reserve
account with Intermountain Accounting Corporation from
which Inland Transport, Inc. would receive their monthly
Lease-Purchase payment, and Ashton would have available funds reserved in that account for the payment of his

i
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maintenance and repairs, the payment of his tire replacement, the payment of his insurance, the payment of
his license and taxes, and the payment of his drivers. (R
190, Exhibit 8). At a later date, he executed a Power of
Attorney giving one E. D. Snider the power and authority
to endorse drafts issued by Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc.
for the limited purpose of depositing same in the account
of Intermountain Accounting Corporation to make possible the proper handling of that reserve account. (R 190,
Exhibit 16).
After Ashton entered into the Lease-Purchase Agreement with Inland Transport, Inc. in July, 1973, and then
started pulling loads for Young, he was paid on a per mile
basis by Young depending upon the type of commodity
being hauled, the weight of the load, and the distance he
pulled the load with his tractor. From those settlements
with Young, there were no usual employee deductions
made such as F.I.C.A., Federal Withholding Tax, State
Withholding Tax, or the like. (R 111-115)
He received in full all of the revenue earned for
pulling loads on Young's authority, with the net amount
being paid into Intermountain Accounting, Inc. pursuant
to the assignment he had made so that they could take
care of his operating expenses and truck payment, and he
received the remaindei- of the gross settlement from Young
without any deductions whatsoever. (R 117-119)
In the operation of his tractor, Young at no time
paid any of the operating costs of same, but only paid
him on a per mile basis for the freight hauling he did for
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Young. He took care of all of his own maintenance and
repair of the truck, payment of his trip permits, payment
for his co-driver, and was also fully responsible for the
procurement of all of his overweight permits, and the
payment for same. (R 98-99, 111, 123, 124, 127, 152).
In transporting a load of freight, Ashton would
submit a trip plan to Young, and on that trip plan would
list certain check-in points. He did not, however, necessarily have to follow that trip plan, and on several
occasions failed to do so. He could arrive one or more
days late without penalty, change his course in any way he
wanted, with the only requirement being that he get the
freight to its ultimate destination, and could refuse to
take loads of freight at any time he desired. (R 103-119,
127, 162,165)
It was while Ashton was hauling freight, under the
above relationship between the parties, that he had an
accident and injured his back.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

ASHTON WAS A N INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, A N D WAS NOT A N EMPLOYEE
OF YOUNG FOR WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PURPOSES.
The Industrial Commission predicated their findings
of fact and conclusions of law upon an erroneous assumption that Inland Transport, Inc., was a financing agency
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of Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc., and that Intermountain
Accounting Corporation acted as paying agents of Harry
L. Young & Sons, Inc. (R 245) The Industrial Commission also made the erroneous assumption that Harry L.
Young & Sons was leasing a truck to Ashton; whereas,
the record clearly shows that Inland Transport, Inc. was
the only company that ever leased a truck to Ashton, and
that Ashton's relationship with Young was to use that
truck that he had leased from Inland Transport, Inc. to
haul freight for Young.
At no place throughout the 165 pages of transcript or
in the 24 exhibits is there any evidence at all to support
the erroneous assumption upon which findings of fact
were predicated that Inland Transport, Inc. was a financing
agency of Young or that Intermountain Accounting Corporation was a paying agent of Young.
Exhibits 15, 15A, 17 and 18 all show that Ashton
was being paid by Young as a lessor, and that he in turn
paid the money into Intermountain Accounting Corporation who in turn, pursuant to an agreement that he had
entered into directly with them, would pay his truck payments, his maintenance, insurance and the like, but there
is nothing in those exhibits or in the testimony given before the Industrial Commission that would indicate that
Intermountain Accounting Corporation was the agent of
Young.
Exhibit 4, which are the check stubs that Ashton received while he was driving for Dinneen and Sainsbury
indicate also, as does Ashton's testimony that he was the
«
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employee of Dinneen and Sainsbury and not Young, that
Intermountain Accounting Corporation was acting as an
accounting service to several lease operators, and not as
a disbursing organization for Young.
The lease agreement, Exhibit 7, is between Inland
Transport, Inc., not as an agent or a division of Young,
but as a separate corporation and Ashton. Nothing within
that document, or the testimony in the record would indicate that Inland Transport, Inc. was "a financing agency
of H. L. Young & Sons." Without any evidentuary support for the proposition that Inland or Intermountain are
divisions of or agents for Young, we must look at the
relationship that existed between Young and Ashton to determine their relationship one to another. In making this
examination, it must be kept in mind that Young is a
regulated Interstate Motor Carrier subject to the Motor
Carrier Safety Regulations and must, by necessity, inasmuch as freight is being hauled under their authority,
make sure that the freight is hauled in compliance with
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations.
In complying with the Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, Young's Safety Director at the time Ashton went
to work for Dinneen, took an application for employment in compliance with the Motor Carrier Safety Regulation 391.23 and administered a written examination (Exhibit 3), after which it issued Ashton a Driver's Certificate
of Qualification (Exhibit 1), and also a Driver Instructions Governing Enroute Meal and Routine Stops. (Exhibit 2) However, so as to clearly indicate to Ashton
that the application was being processed and the test being
*
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given, and the Certificates issued after completion of same,
only for the purpose of complying with the Motor Carrier
Safety Regulations, he was required to execute a form
that is the last page of Exhibit 3 (R 185), and which is
also shown as Exhibit 23 (R 208). In that document, the
following language is contained:
"I, Dennis A. Ashton, fully understand and agree
that Harry L. Young & Sons Company, Inc. is not
my employer, and that Harry L. Young & Sons,
Inc. does not employ any drivers. The statistical
information which I have furnished Harry L.
Young & Sons Company, Inc. is for screening purposes only, to determine whether I qualify for
driving under Department of Transportation and
Company Safety Regulations.
"I also fully understand that my wages will be set
and paid by the owner of the equipment (contractor) that accepts me as his employee and driver.
I will furnish all necessary documents to the owner
of the equipment (Employer) to figure and determine wages due me.
*T further understand and agree that if I am
accepted, I will abide by all Department of Transportation Safety Regulations and will be conversant with same."
Young is in a position, as an Interstate Motor Carrier,
where it must comply with certain safety regulations, and
in doing so must insist that lease-operators hauling freight
over its authority also comply with those regulations. It
is, therefore, in somewhat the same position that the insurance company was in in the case of Christean v. Industrial Commission, 113 U. 451, 196 P. 2d 502, where it,
the company, exercised certain control over its salesmen
»
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consisting of his limitation to bind the company contractu a l l y , and the right to control the result of his work, but
not to control how the work should be done.
The evidence in this case would indicate that it falls
within that type of a situation. Inasmuch as the leaseoperators are operating over Young's authority, it is its
responsibility, in complying with the Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations, to control the overall shipping results, but
it does not go to the extent of directing how work should
be done in that Ashton could travel over the highways he
desired to travel over, set his own enroute call points, and
leave and arrive when he wanted to. Even though the
choice of routes between Salt Lake City and Los Angeles
going to the south and west and Salt Lake City and Oakland going to the west are not that numerous, Ashton,
nonetheless could elect which route to take, and his checkin points to advise Young as to where he then had the
load of freight located.
Some examples in the testimony that Ashton was
directing his own work, and not under the control and
direction of Young are found at R 118, as follows:
"Q. Now as I understand the situation then, your
testimony is you left here and went up to
Pocatello; is that correct?
A.

That's right.

Q.

And took four days off; is that correct?

A.

Yes, sir.

"

Q.

>

•

•

Did you get prior permission to take four days
off?
^
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A.

I wouldn't call it permission. They were
aware of the fact I was going to take time off.

Q.

So you didn't feel it was necessary to get permission, did you?

A.

They don't ask me, I don't ask them.

Q.

Sure. And, based upon that custom and practice, you did in fact take four days off?

A.

That's right. I did."

The testimony was also to the effect that he could
refuse to take loads if he wanted to, or require that they be
loaded to his specifications before having to take them.
Some illustrative testimony to that effect is found at R
163, as follows:
"Q. Let's be sure I understand this trip. Mr. Ashton. If you were directed to do something, and
you felt it was illegal, or was in fact illegal,
you didn't do it? Right?
A.

I refused to do it.

Q.

You weren't fired for that were you?

A.

Threatened, yes.

Q.

Were you fired for it?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Did you still drive with them afterwards?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Because that was your truck? Isn't that correct? You would have been legally responsible for an overweight?

A.

That's right, sir.
W
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Q.

So you told them that you weren't going to
do it?

A

That's right.

Q

And, in fact, you didn't do it?

A

I did do it.

Q

But on your terms?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

You still drove with them afterwards? Right?

A

Yes, sir."

As pointed out in the Statement of Facts, Ashton was
in possession of the truck under a lease with an option
to purchase from Inland Transport, Inc., had no payroll
deductions made by Young, but was paid strictly on a per
load basis depending on where he traveled, the size of
the load, and how many miles he traveled, was paid no
overtime, and had none of the other usual incidences of
an employer-employee relationship, but had all of the
incidences of an independent contractor relationship.
This Court has dealt with the distinction between an
employer-employee relationship and the independent contractor status on numerous occasions. In the case of Maryland Casualty Company v. Industrial Commission, 12
U. 2d 223, 364 P. 2d 1020, after noting that there was
much difficulty involved in formulating an all inclusive
and exclusive definition, set out the following guidelines
to be considered in making that distinction, as follows:
«# # # it is sufficient for our purpose here to observe that generally speaking an employee is one

m
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v

who is hired and paid at some designated rate, usually specified as a wage or salary, to do work that
is part of the trade or business of his employer, and
is subject to continuous supervision, direction and
control in performing his duties; whereas, an independent contractor is usually engaged to do
some particular piece of work for a set sum for
the completed job, and is not subject to such supervision, direction or control, but may pursue the
work in his own way, and is responsible only for
completing it as required by his contract."

In the Utah case of Sutton v. Industrial Commission
of Utah, 9 U. 2d 339, 44 P. 2d 538, the Court also observed that the elements of control by the employer and
the intent of the parties, are the most important factors, but that none of the factors, considered separately, is
controlling, and that all of the facts considered together
will be used in determining whether the relationship is in
essence that of employer-employee or of independent
contractors.
There have been several Utah cases dealing with
local trucking concerns, and the question as to whether or
not there was an employer-employee relationship or an
independent contractor relationship existing in those
cases. None of those cases have, however, been directly
in point with the case at bar which deals with a leaseoperator's relationship with a regulated interstate motor
carrier. The cases referred to, dealing with local trucking
concerns are Kinder v. Industrial Commission, 106 U.
448, 150 P. 2d 109; Luker Sand and Gravel v. Industrial
Commission, 82 U. 188, 23 P. 2d 225; and Gallegos v.
Stringham, 21 U.2d 139, 442 P. 2d 31-

n
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In the Luker case, a truck owner hired drivers and
pro-rated operating costs and income with them where
they were engaged in a hauling contract for a general
contractor. The truck owner indicated the route to be
followed by the driver, and told him that the general
contractor's supervisor would tell him where to go and
how much to haul on each load. Luker directed the driver
to put higher sides on the truck, so as to be able to carry
more gravel, which he did, and directed the driver where
to haul the gravel. As part of the contract, each truck
was checked by a government inspector as they arrived
on the job site. In holding that Luker Sand and Gravel
was not the employer of the truck drivers, the Court observed:
"That the sand and gravel should be delivered
at the Veterans' Hospital with reasonable expedition and as required by the government contractors
as to quantity was all the sand and gravel company
was interested in."
In the Kinder case, Kinder as a driver of a thirdperson's truck was hired to use that truck for the purpose
of hauling gravel from Wasatch Sand and Gravel Pit.
No directions were given him regarding the route he had
to take; however, if he, or other truckers, were not hauling sufficient amounts to meet the contractor's requirements, then, he, the contractor, could hire other truckers
to meet the needs. There were no set rules as to hours that
would have to be worked by the truckers, or the amount
of time they would be given to haul any specific load. Also,
there was no requirement as to how many loads they would
have to haul during any given time frame. The truckers
13
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furnished their own trucks, paid for their own repairs,
and operating costs such as oil and gas, and the contractor was not responsible for any of these items. Under
that fact situation, this court held that there was no employer-employee relationship in that the only control over
the truckers exercised by the contractor was the direction
as to where the load should be loaded up and where it
should be unloaded.
The Gallegos case was distinguished from the Luker
case and the Kinder case on its facts, inasmuch as that case
dealt with a fact situation where a truck owner, by way of
oral contract, agreed to furnish a truck, along with a
driver, to the plaintiff's employer. The truck owner was
then paid by the hour for the use of the truck, and as a
condition of the employment, the truck had to maintain
its position in the line of trucks so as to make sure that it
was hauling its fair share of the overall commodity. A
distinction that the Court pointed out was:
"Defendant was told when to speed his trips and
when to back up to the traxcavator and when to
drive away, and he could not haul dirt in any other
manner than as he was told.
«# # * if th e driver of the truck failed to maintain his position in line, the foreman of Gibbons
and Reed could stop the truck from hauling.
«* * * Because Gibbons and Reed paid $10.00
per hour for the use of the truck, including the
driver, it could not afford to let the driver determine the amount of work to be done. Such a
rate of pay justified and made necessary the control of the movement of the truck by the company."
M
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The Court, in the Gallegos case, and in distinguishing it from the Luker case, the Kinder case, and other
cases, noted the distinction was based upon the control
exercised in the Gallegos case over the employee, which
was lacking in the cases otherwise distinguished.
In distinguishing the Gallegos case from the Luker
case, the Court stated:
"The instant case is distinguished from the Luker
case because here Gibbons and Reed Company did
direct and control the movement of the truck and
the pay was by the hour and not by the cubic yards
hauled. Gibbons and Reed would thus be decidedly
interested in the number of trips made by Stringham."
With the record showing that Ashton, after entering
into a lease-purchase agreement with Inland Transport,
Inc. and then putting the truck to work hauling loads for
Young, on Young's interstate authority, but, with Ashton
deciding when he wanted to haul loads, paying for all
of his own expenses, and receiving a settlement from
Young based upon the number of miles between points
the load was hauled, clearly indicates that he was an independent contractor and not an employee of Young. In
support of this conclusion is the fact that he was not paid
as an employee, with the usual deductions being made,
but was paid as an independent contractor based upon
the gross contract price. Also, when he had entered into a
lease-purchase agreement where he had possession and
control, and ultimate direction over the use of a certain
vehicle, which he chose to operate for Young as a lease
operator. Exhibit 20 (R 203) insofar as that Exhibit contains registration certificates, indicates that the registered
W
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owner of the vehicle was Inland Transport, Inc., and
Young appears thereon only as a lessee, inasmuch as
Ashton, after entering into the Lease-Purchase agreement
with Inland, leased the truck back on to Young so as to
enable himself to operate under Young's Interstate Authority. Ashton also was maintaining and repairing his vehicle, was paying for his own trip permits, was paying
his second driver, and was responsible for all overweight
violations. None of these were paid by Young, and the
only responsibility Young had was to pay the contract
price on a per mile basis for the loads that Ashton elected
to haul for Young.
Also, even though Ashton executed a trip plan in
connection with each load of freight he hauled, he, and
not Young, set the time when he would leave, the points
where he would check in, and the time when he would
arrive. There is absolutely nothing in the record that would
indicate that Young required him to leave at a certain time,
check in at a certain place, and to arrive at a certain destination at a given time. Testimony of that relationship is
clearly indicated at R 127, where the following questions
were asked and answers given:
"Q. Did H. L. Young & Sons, Inc. set forth any
formal document that would require you to
drive so many miles or take so many trips, in
a particular period of time?
A.

No, sir.

Q.

Therefore — if that be
come would, in a large
your own ambition and
wanted to take? Is that

A.

Yes."

the case — your inmeasure, depend on
how many trips you
a fair statement?

1#
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In addition to the foregoing, Young and Ashton, from
the time of their first contact with each other, entered into
an agreement, heretofore cited, whereby Ashton specifically agreed and understood that he was not an employee of Young, and that Young in fact had no employees who operated trucks, but that all of the truck
operators were independent contractors.
The facts of this case are much closer and even
stronger than the Luker Sand and Gravel v. Industrial
Commission, 82 U. 188, 23 P. 2d 225, and Kinder v. Industrial Commission, 106 U. 448, 150 P. 2d 109. They are
clearly distinguishable from Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 U.
2d 139, 442 P. 2d 31, inasmuch as the employer in that
case was exercising considerable if not absolute control
over the employee. That, of course, is by no means the
case in the instant situation.
CONCLUSIONS
The Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact and
Order should be reversed, and they should be directed to
enter new findings to the effect that Ashton was not an
employee of Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc.; but that he was
an independent contractor, and not entitled to workmen's
compensation as Young's employee.
Respectfully submitted,
Wendell E. Bennett
STRONG & HANNI
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Petitioner
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